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ABSTRACT
Computing systems and mobile technologies have changed
dramatically since the introduction of firewall technology in 1988.
The internet has grown from a simple network of networks to a
cyber and physical entity that encompasses the entire planet. Cyberphysical systems(CPS) now control most of the day to day
operations of human civilization from autonomous cars to nuclear
energy plants. While phenomenal, this growth has created new
security threats. These are threats that cannot be blocked by a
firewall for they are not only cyber but cyber-physical. In light of
these cyber-physical threats, this paper proposes a security measure
that promises to enhance the security of cyber-physical systems.
Using theoretical cyber, physical, and cyber-physical attack
scenarios, this paper highlights the need for additional monitoring
of cyber-physical systems as an extra security measure.
Additionally, we illustrate the efficiency of the proposed monitor
using a Shannon entropy proof, and a multiple security domain
nondeducibility (MSDND) proof.
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1 Introduction
In May of 2017, a ransomware attack held most of the
developed world hostage, crippling healthcare systems,
manufacturing systems, and multiple critical infrastructures across
∗
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the globe. The British National Health Services was forced to limit
health care to only emergency cases [7]. If not for a timely kill
switch, the attack could have brought forth catastrophic damage to
nuclear plants, air transportation systems, and many other
infrastructures. The Wannacry [7] ransomware attack is a recent
example of a now critical threat. A great many cyber and physical
attacks keep cropping up all over the world, most notably; the Iran
stuxnet attack [4] , which, according to Iran’s civil defense agency,
was still a threat in October of 2018 [18], the byzantine replay
attack [19], and the Ukraine power grid attack that left more than
230,000 people without electricity [20]. [23] provides an extensive
list of typical security threats that are facing smart-city CPS and
detailed countermeasures available to defend against these.
Because cyber-physical systems (CPS), are physical entities with
cyber functionality, traditional cybersecurity measures are simply
not sufficient to mitigate the threat posed by this new wave of
cyber-physical attacks [1]. While traditional cyber attacks were
easily deducible and susceptible to prevention by means of a
firewall or antivirus software, it has been shown that recent attacks
like the Iran Stuxnet attack could go undetected for long periods of
time [5]. A search for a solution to these threats should, therefore,
focus on making the occurrence of such attacks almost impossible,
and if the attacks remain possible, then they should at least be
swiftly deducible.
The protection of cyber-physical systems cannot depend
on the effectiveness of a single detection mechanism [5]. However,
the majority of the proposed Cyber-physical security measures
have centered around the notion of a single monitoring unit. The
Shadow Security Unit(SSU) [16] proposed by Cruz et al is a viable
idea, but considering that the SSU is a single unit that employs only
cybersecurity measures, a cyber attack that targets the central
monitoring unit itself, if not detected early, could be fatal to the rest
of the CPS. Scaglione, Peisert, and McParland acknowledge the
need for both a centralized and distributed monitor but the proposed
monitor is only an algorithm [14]. While it’s a great algorithm, it’s
still a cyber measure which will inevitably be vulnerable to some
cyber attack. The same could be said about the Intrusion Detection
Systems(IDSs) [15], that is, IDSs are also a single cyber measure.
For an extensive look at the many cyber attacks, industry CPS
models, and common cyber measure, we direct the reader to [19].
Other than purely cyber measures, some scholars have
proposed the use of physics based measures to detect attacks, but
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these very rarely provide ways to mitigate the attacks or prevent
them in the first place [21]. The primary idea of those methods is
that physical properties of the system models can be used to detect
attacks. Their paper presents a detailed survey of recent physicsbased attack detection schemes in CPS models. Our research
proposes the addition of a hybrid monitor spread over virtual nodes
with randomized features. This addition to a CPS would provide a
much-needed auxiliary layer of security and also enhance attack
deductibility.
This paper is arranged as follows; Section 2 introduces
the tools used in testing the viability of the proposed hybrid monitor
as a security measure for CPS. Section 3 gives a comprehensive
look at the hybrid monitor, listing its features and the reasoning
behind each feature. Section 4 explains the methodology used to
demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the hybrid monitor.
Section 5 presents the test scenarios and proofs. Section 6 wraps up
with a short conclusion.

2 Background
This research employs the Future Renewable Electric
Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM) [2] System as a
model CPS. Shannon entropy [8] is used as a tool to test the
effectiveness of the monitor as a security measure. The multiple
security domain nondeducibility(MSDND) [1] is used as a tool to
test the effectiveness of the monitor in detecting attacks.
The FREEDM system center is a engineering research
center funded by the National Science Foundation and spanning
number of universities including but not limited to North Carolina
State University, Missouri University of Science and Technology
and Florida State University. The research center developed an
energy management and distribution smart grid system located at
the North Carolina State University that is also referred to as
FREEDM [2]. The heart of this energy system is the Distributed
Grid Intelligence (DGI) [2], an intelligent algorithm that
implements energy management and distribution using modular
adapters to interact with devices in a smart grid over different
interfaces. In this paper, the FREEDM system is employed as a test
subject for the implementation of the hybrid monitor proposed by
this research.
The MSDND model is a security model that tests the
integrity and confidentiality of a cyber-physical architecture. The
MSDND model uses logic proofs to test information flow security;
that is, how information moves among user groups within the
security domains (SDs) that make up the system [1]. Howser and
Mcmillin show that maintaining information flow security in CPS
is challenging because the flow is irrevocably linked among the
CPS’ cyber and physical units [1]. Therefore, the MSDND model
is employed to account for both cyber and physical information
flow paths. The model defines two system properties namely:
MSDND secure and notMSDND secure [1]. An MSDND secure
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system implies that for information flowing from entity A to entity
B, entity B cannot deduce whether the information is valid or
erroneous. This also means while an MSDND secure system is
desirable if the goal is to maintain confidentiality, it can be an
indicator of the possibility of an attack going undetected. A
notMSDND secure system implies the alternative, that is, entity B
can evaluate the correctness of information obtained from entity A.
Therefore, in the event of an attack, Howser, and McMillin shows
that a notMSDND secure system could easily detect the occurrence
of an attack [1]. Thudimila and McMillin demonstrate the
superiority of MSDND over traditional electronic and
cryptographic solutions [3] when applied to detection of attacks in
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast(ADS-B) air traffic
surveillance system [3]. For this research, MSDND is used to
analyze whether a CPS with a hybrid monitor in place would
deduce the occurrence of an attack.
Phan et al introduce the idea of using information flowmetrics like Shannon entropy to measure information leakage in
CPS programs [9]. Li uses Shannon Entropy to break down the
physical dynamics of CPS and goes on to show the negative
entropy that communication adds to the general entropy of a CPS
[10]. In this text, Shannon Entropy is used to illustrate the decrease
in the possibility of an attack in a CPS after the introduction of a
hybrid monitor. This demonstrates the value of adding a hybrid
monitor to CPS architectures as an extra security measure.
Shannon entropy is an information theory concept
derived from the general idea of information entropy that was
developed and introduced by Claude Shannon [8]. Entropy is
basically a measure of uncertainty in a communication system
where a low entropy value implies minimal uncertainty and a high
entropy implies the contrary. Shannon entropy defines entropy (H)
as:

Where I is the information content of the discrete random
variable X. Therefore we can further define E[I(X)] in terms of the
probability mass function of X: i.e,

The generally definition of entropy H then comes to:

3

The Hybrid Monitor

Introduction of a Hybrid Monitor to Cyber-Physical
Systems
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To better protect cyber-physical systems, this research
proposes the addition of a monitor. Many other researchers have
explored the use of hybrid monitoring to ensure safety or/and
security in CPSs. Li et al. propose extended hybrid automata
modeling for vehicular CPSs as a safety and control measure [11].
Mao and Chen also introduce a runtime hybrid automaton
monitoring framework for the Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control Systems(CACC) [12]. This research borrows the idea of
hybrid monitoring but with randomization as an additional feature.
The addition of randomization in information flow paths’
generation increases the system’s entropy and in turn, reduces the
chances of a successful attack in a generic CPS. That is because a
higher number of information flow paths increases the number of
points the attacker has to corrupt to remain undetected. Below is a
detailed break down of this hybrid monitor’s features;
▪

▪

▪

The monitor is hybrid, that is, both virtual and physical,
central and decentralized. The monitor would have both
a virtual component and physical component. The virtual
components would be implemented as a hidden
algorithm in every Supervisory control and data
acquisition unit (SCADA) in the CPS. The physical
component of the monitor would be a physical unit
independent of the entire CPS and running a monitoring
algorithm whose function is to oversee the operations of
the monitor’s virtual components. The physical
component is, therefore, a central unit and the virtual
components are the decentralized units.
The monitor should be intelligent enough to generate
physical invariants for every information flow path in the
CPS. An invariant is simply a logical assertion that
should always be true throughout an execution cycle.
Therefore physical invariants are logical properties of a
CPS that cannot be transformed by cyber entities and
should always be held true. Having physical invariants
makes the CPS vastly more secure because they are
secure from being corrupted by cyber attacks. With that
in mind, the hybrid monitor uses generated physical
invariants as a validator of the information received from
other system modules. The automated generation of
physical invariant using machine learning, deep learning
or linear regression is also a viable research area. The
automation of invariant generation is explored further by
Cruz et al [16].
The virtual components of the monitors would
continuously generate a randomly increasing number of
paths for the flow of information between any two CPS
entities. The physical monitor should also generate a
randomly increasing number of virtual paths as a
compliment to a physical path for the flow of information
between any two virtual components of the monitor.

▪

All paths generated by the monitor should be independent
of each other. This ensures that all the randomly
generated paths cannot be collectively corrupted by an
attacker.

▪

To reduce the information flow overhead, information
sent through the monitors should be sent through a
randomly chosen path among the generated paths and
then white noise should be transmitted on the rest of the
paths.

▪

The monitor should have a routing algorithm that can be
employed if the monitor detects a failure or corruption at
any of the CPS’ entities.

▪

Communication between the virtual and physical
monitor should be done on an entirely different network
than that used by the rest of the cyber-physical system.

Note that this hybrid monitor is only a theoretical idea but the exact
physical realization should at the very least aim to implement the
above mentioned features.

4

Methodology

This research uses two methods to highlight the
significance of introducing a hybrid monitor to a CPS.

4.1

Method 1

The research employs attack scenarios to examine the
security of a CPS with and without the hybrid monitor. There are
three attack scenarios, that is; A purely cyber attack like a
ransomware on a CPS, a completely physical attack like the
attacker inflicting physical damage to the CPS by, for example,
cutting wires and a cyber-physical attack like the Iran Stuxnet
attack expounded upon in Kushner’s [4] and Karnouskos’ [5] work.

4.2

Method 2

In the second method, the research uses two proof models
i.e Shannon entropy and MSDND to show that the addition of a
hybrid monitor makes a CPS less susceptible to an undetected
attack and much more effective at deducing attacks when they do
occur.

5

Research Results

This section details the three attack scenarios, their
respective results, the Shannon entropy proof, and MSDND proof.

5.1

Cyber Attack scenario

As mentioned in the background, the FREEDM system is
controlled by a distributed algorithm called the DGI. The DGI is
set up to run on multiple nodes spread out over a network. It
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provides an interface for energy management applications to
communicate with physical power devices.
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go even further to keep critical functions running while the damage
gets fixed.

5.3

Cyber-physical Attack scenario

The third and last scenario assumes that a microcontroller
in FREEDM system is infected by Stuxnet (figure 2). Erroneous
Information from this microcontroller could cause catastrophic
damage to the smart grid. In this case, deducing the presence of the
Stuxnet and reducing the damage to the smart grid are both
necessary.

Figure 1: The DGI under a WannaCry attack
Let us assume that a DGI node is being held hostage by
the wannaCry ransomware (figure 1). This kind of attack is rather
easy to detect because ransomware attacks normally make the user
aware that the attack is in progress. Therefore, for this scenario,
attack deductibility is not important. But because the attacker is
holding a node hostage, all information flowing through this node
could be infected by the attacker. This could give the attacker
further access to other nodes since all nodes of the DGI share state
information. At this point, it’s clear that the entire DGI could be
held hostage. Since the DGI manages the entire FREEDM smart
grid system, the entire CPS would be either rendered useless or
could be left vulnerable to more damaging attacks.
Now let’s consider a scenario where a hybrid monitor
was in place with virtual units running alongside every DGI node
and a physical unit to oversee the virtual units. Because all traffic
that goes through a node is verified by the monitor and subjected to
physical invariants generated by the monitor, it would be easy for
the monitor to flag the presence of the ransomware. Since the
monitor has information flow routing capabilities, all state
information from other nodes would be safely rerouted through
other nodes. While the infected node would not be saved, the rest
of the DGI would continue to function without threat.

5.2 Physical Attack scenario
For this scenario, we assume that an attacker has inflicted
physical damage to the CPS without using cyber means. The
damage could be as simple as cutting an Ethernet cord or breaking
a sensor. The detection and solution for such an attack are also
rather simple. However, if the CPS is a critical infrastructure like a
nuclear reactor that needs to continuously keep some functions
fully operational then even this simple attack could prove fatal.
With a monitor in place, any failure in the CPS would quickly be
detected. The monitor, through information flow rerouting, would

Figure 2: The DGI under a Stuxnet attack
From the Iran attack, it’s clear that the Stuxnet could go
unnoticed for a long time if no extra security measure is put in
place. Although, if the FREEDM system had a hybrid monitor, the
Stuxnet would be detected because all information from the
microcontroller would have to be verified by the monitor. Since the
monitor has physical invariants to prove the correctness of
information from this microcontroller, any discrepancies in the
information generated by the Stuxnet would be caught. On
detection, information flow would then be routed through other
nodes and further infection would be avoided. The Stuxnet would
have to infect all random paths used by the hybrid monitor to avoid
detection. The Shannon Entropy proof below shows that there is a
very small possibility of the Stuxnet or attacker infecting all of the
hybrid monitor’s random paths.

5.4

MSDND proof

For this proof, let’s look at the cyber-physical Stuxnet
attack shown above. More specifically, the information path
between the infected microcontroller and the DGI node process
running on the computer without the monitor.

Introduction of a Hybrid Monitor to Cyber-Physical
Systems

CPS-SPC’19, Nov, 2019, London, UK

is false. Therefore the Stuxnet would go undetected. Knowin this,
let us take a look at a scenario with the monitor in place.
The difference in this scenario is the presence of a
monitor that is equipped with physical invariants. Using a physical
invariant, the monitor can evaluate the validity of φ. With this, the
monitor can also determine the state of the microcontroller with
respect to the validity of φ; i.e,.. There exist a valuation Vφmon
leaving the state SDφmic deducible [1]. Hence the notMSDND
secure evaluation shown in figure 4.

Figure 3: MSDND evaluation for the DGI without a monitor
Let us define the two domains as SDnode for the DGI
node and SDmic for the microcontroller with valuation functions
Vnode and Vmic respectively. Then consider a scenario where
arbitrary information (φ) is sent from the infected microcontroller
to the DGI node process. If the DGI node process and
microcontroller are at the same level of security, then the DGI node
process will trust that information from the infected microcontroller
to be valid. Since the information can be either true or false, the
first condition; i.e,.. (SDφmic, SD¬φmic ) for MSDND is met [1].
This is derived from the fact that if φ is true then SDφmic is true or
if φ is false then SD¬φmic is true hence the xor statement is always
true.
The second condition is also satisfied from the
assumption that the two domains are at the same security level [1].
Therefore, the DGI node process believes and trusts the infected
microcontroller. This means the DGI node process has no valuation
function to prove the validity of φ [1]. The absence of this valuation
function (Vφnode) leaves the system in an MSDND secure system
[1]. This is the MSDND secure evaluation shown in figure 4.

The proof shows that in the event of a cyber-physical
attack like the Stuxnet attack, the presence of a monitor would
render the attack deducible. For the attack to go undetected with a
monitor in place, the attacker would have to infect every single
monitor node, both virtual and physical. The next Shannon entropy
proof will show that the possibility of compromising all the monitor
nodes without being detected is rather minimal.

5.5

Shannon Entropy proof

The proof considers two scenarios where the attacker is
attempting to infect the information flow between the DGI node
process and the microcontroller.
First, let us take a look at the entropy of the setup without
the monitor. There are two possible information flow events x_1
and x_2 that the attack could target. With a sample space = 2, the
probability of the attacker successfully infecting information flow
between the DGI node process and microcontroller is ½. The
entropy evaluation for this scenario is shown below.

Figure 5: Shannon Entropy evaluation for the DGI without a
monitor

Figure 4: MSDND evaluation for the DGI with a monitor
The implication of this MSDND evaluation is that if the
infected microcontroller sent false information to the DGI node
process, there would be no way of evaluating that the information
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With a monitor in place, the sample space grows to (2n +
2), making the probability of successfully corrupting one path come
to 1/[2(n + 1)]. Here is the entropy evaluation;

Figure 6: Shannon Entropy evaluation for the DGI with a
monitor
The proof shows us that the entropy increases with the
increase in the size of n paths. From the attacker’s point of view,
the uncertainty increases with increasing size of n paths. Therefore
as the size of n increases, it becomes much harder for the attacker
to launch a successful attack on the CPS. By adding the hybrid
monitor, the system is not fully secure from an attack but the
possibility of a successful attack is vastly smaller.

6 Conclusion
After 2017’s Ransomware attack [17], the world can not
ignore the threat posed by the possibility of using attacks on cyberphysical systems as a tool for terrorism and cyber warfare. The
increased occurrence of cyber-physical systems attacks is surely an
indicator that traditional cybersecurity measures are insufficient at
prevention and detection of these attacks. The world needs to start
considering alternative or improved security measures. The
combination of an intelligent, randomized physical monitor with
existing virtual cyber measures to create a hybrid monitor is a good
place to start. While, the hybrid monitor is not a foolproof solution
to cyber-physical attacks, it could well be the best solution yet.
Future research in this area should focus on physical
implementation of the hybrid monitor and prevention of attacks
targeting the hybrid monitor itself. This hybrid monitor could be
the great leap towards fully securing an important and
nonexpendable entity of smart living that is cyber-physical systems.
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